G3-style Sequent calculi for the logics in the cube of non-normal modal logics and for their deontic extensions are introduced. For each of the calculi considered, we prove that weakening and contraction are height-preserving admissible, and we give a syntactic proof of the admissibility of cut. This implies that the subformula property holds for them and that they are decidable. These calculi are shown to be equivalent to the axiomatic ones and, therefore, they are sound and complete with respect to neighbourhood semantics. Finally, we give a Maehara-style proof of Craig's interpolation theorem for most of the logics considered.
Introduction
For many interpretations of the modal operators -e.g., for deontic, epistemic, game-theoretic, and high-probability interpretations -it is necessary to adopt logics that are weaker than the normal modal ones; e.g., deontic paradoxes, see [14] , are one of the main motivations for adopting a non-normal deontic logic. Non-normal logics, see [2] for naming conventions, are quite well understood from a semantic point of view [7, 19] . Nevertheless, until recent years their proof theory has been rather limited since it was mostly confined to Hilbert-style axiomatic systems. This situation seems to be rather critical since it is difficult to build countermodels in these semantics and it is difficult to find derivations in axiomatic systems. When the aim is to find derivations and to analyse their structural properties, sequent calculi are to be preferred to axiomatic systems. Recently different kinds of sequent calculi for non-normal logics have been proposed. Gentzen-style calculi for them have been presented in [8, 9, 10, 18] . Labelled calculi based on a translation into normal modal logics have been presented in [5] , and labelled calculi based on the internalization of neighbourhood semantics have been presented in [15] . Finally, linear nested sequents for non-normal logics have been presented in [11] .
This paper, which extends the approach presented in [18] , concentrates on Gentzen-style calculi since they are better suited than their extensions to give (computationally optimal) decision procedures and constructive proofs of interpolation theorems. The existing Gentzensyle sequent calculi for non-normal logics, see Section 5, either cover only the so-called monotone non-normal logics [8] , or do not allow to eliminate all the structural rules of inference [9, 10] and, therefore, it is not possible to use them to determine whether a given formula is derivable or not by means of a root-first proof search procedure. Furthermore, although there are rules of inference that capture both deontic axioms D ✸ := ✷A ⊃ ✸A and D ⊥ := ¬✷⊥ [9, 22] , to our knowledge there is no sequent rule that captures satisfactorily only one of them (when they are not interderivable). Finally, despite the existence of semantic proofs of Craig's interpolation theorem for non-normal logics, see e.g. [7] , for most of them there is no constructive proof of this result. This paper studies cut-and contraction-free G3-style sequent calculi for all the logics the cube of non-normal modalities and for their extension with the deontic axioms D ✸ and D ⊥ . The calculi we present have the subformula property, allow for a straightforward decision procedure by a terminating root-first proof search, and in most cases they allow us to give a constructive proof of Craig's interpolation theorem.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 summarizes the basic notions of axiomatic systems and of neighbourhood semantics for non-normal logics. Section 3 presents G3-style sequent calculi for 
these logics for then showing that weakening and contraction are height-preserving admissible and that cut is (syntactically) admissible. As consequences of the admissiblity of the structural rules, we have that they allow for a terminating proof-search and that they are equivalent to the axiomatic systems. Section 4 gives and constructive proof of Craig's interpolation theorem for the logics not containing rules LR-C and L-D ✸ ( Table 4 ). Finally Section 5 considers some related works.
2 Non-normal Logics
Axiomatic Systems
We introduce, following [2] , the basic notions of non-normal modal logics that will be used later on. Given a countable set of propositional variables {p n : n ∈ N}, the formulas of the modal language L are generated by:
We remark that ⊥ is a 0-ary logical symbol, this will be extremely important in the proof of Craig's interpolation theorem. As usual ¬A is a shorthand for A ⊃ ⊥, ⊤ for ⊥ ⊃ ⊥, A ↔ B for (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A), and ✸A for ¬✷¬A. We follow the usual conventions for parentheses. Let L be the logic containing as axioms all L-instances of propositional tautologies, and as inference rule the modus ponens (M P ). The minimal non-normal modal logic E is the logic L plus the rule RE of Table 1 . We will consider all the logics that are obtained by extending E with some set of axioms from Table 2 . We will denote the logics accordingly to the axioms that define them, e.g. EC is the logic E ⊕ C, and EMD ⊥ is E ⊕ M ⊕ D ⊥ . By X we denote any of these logics and we write X ⊢ A whenever A is a theorem of X. We will call modal the logics containing neither D ⊥ nor D ✸ , and deontic the logics containing at least one of them. Observe that we have followed the usual naming conventions for the modal axioms, but we have introduced new naming conventions for the deontic ones: the deontic axiom D ⊥ is usually called CON and D ✸ is usually called D, cf. [1] . It is also possible to give an equivalent rule-bases axiomatization of some of these logics, see [2] . In particular, the logic EM, also called M, can be axiomatixed as L plus the rule RM of Table 1 . The logic EMC, also called R, can be axiomatized as L plus the rule RR of Table  1 . Finally, the logic EMCN, i.e. the smallest normal modal logic K, can be axiomatized as L plus the rule RK of Table 1 . These rule-based axiomatizations will be useful later on since they ease the proof of the equivalence between the axiomatic systems and the sequent calculi (Theorem 3.9).
The following proposition states the well-known relations between the theorems of nonnormal modal logics logics, for a proof the reader is referred to [2] .
Analogously for the logics containing axiom N and/or axiom C.
Axiom D ⊥ is K-equivalent with the schema D ✸ := ¬(✷A ∧ ✷¬A), but the correctness of D ✸ has been a big issue in the literature on deontic logic. This fact urges us to study logics weaker than KD with respect to which D ⊥ and D ✸ are no more equivalent [2] . The deontic formulas D ⊥ and D ✸ have the following relations in the logics we are considering. Proposition 2.2. D ⊥ and D ✸ are independent in E; D ⊥ is derivable from D ✸ in non-normal logics containing at least one of the axiom M and N ; D ✸ is derivable from D ⊥ non-normal logics containing the axiom C.
In Figure 1 the reader finds the lattice of non-normal modal logics, see [2, p. 237] , and in Figure 2 the lattice of non-normal deontic logics.
Semantics
The most widely known semantics for non-normal logics is neighbourhood semantics. We sketch its main tenets following [2] , where neighbourhood models are called minimal models. The definition of truth of a formula A at a world w of a neighbourhood model M -|= M w Ais the standard one for the classical connectives with the addition of
where ||A|| M is the truth set of A -i.e., ||A|| M = {w : |= M w A}. We say that a formula A is globally true in M =< W, N, P > iff ||A|| M = W , and that a formula is valid in a class C of neighbourhood models iff it is globally true in every M ∈ C.
In order to give soundness and completeness results for non-normal modal and deontic logics with respect to (classes of) neighbourhood models, we introduce the following definition. Definition 2.4. Let M =< W, N, P > be a neighbourhood model, X, Y ∈ 2 w , and w ∈ W , we say that:
• M contains the unit whenever W ∈ N (w);
• M is non-blind whenever if X ∈ N (w) then X = {∅};
• M is complement-free whenver if X ∈ N (w), then W − X ∈ N (w).
We also introduce the following results from correspondence theory. Proposition 2.5. We have the following correspondence results between L-formulas and the properties of the neighbourhood function defined above:
• Axiom M corresponds to supplementation;
• Axiom C corresponds to closure under finite intersection;
• Axiom N corresponds to containment of the unit;
• Axiom D ⊥ corresponds to non-blindness;
• Axiom D ✸ corresponds to complement-freeness.
Theorem 2.6. E is sound and complete with respect to the class of all neighbourhood models.
Any logic X which is obtained by extending E with some axioms from Table 2 is sound and complete with respect to the class of all neighbourhood models which satisfies all the properties corresponding to the axioms of X.
Sequent Calculi
We introduce sequent calculi for non-normal logics that extend the multiset-based sequent calculus G3cp [16, 17, 21] for classical propositional logic -see Table 3 -by adding some modal rule from Table 4 . In particular, we consider the modal sequent calculi given in Table  5 , which will be shown to capture the modal logics of Figure 1 , and their deontic extensions given in Table 6 , which will be shown to capture the deontic logics of Figure 2 . Notice that the rule L-D * are (and can be) used in all and only the calculi for logics where both D ⊥ and D ✸ are theorems. Notice also that to capture deontic logics where D ✸ , but not D ⊥ , is a theorem we have two different rules: in rule L-D ✸2 we impose that the multiset Π of principal formulas contain at most two formulas, whereas in L-D ✸n this restriction is lifted. The rules L-D ⊥ , L-D ✸2 , L-D ✸n and L-D * are called modal even though the label deontic would have been more appropriate. We adopt the following notational conventions: we use G3X to denote a generic calculus from either Table 5 or Table 6 , and we use G3Y(Z) to denote any calculus that contains rules Y and that may contain also rule Z.
For an introduction to G3cp and to the relevant notions, the reader is referred to [16, Chapter 3] . We sketch here the main notions that will be used in this paper. In the rules in Tables 3 and 4 , the multisets Γ and ∆ are called contexts, the other formulas occurring in the conclusion (premiss(es), resp.) are called principal (active). In a sequent the antecedent (succedent ) is the multiset occurring to the left (right) of the sequent arrow =⇒. As for G3cp, a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ has the following denotational interpretation: the conjunction of the formulas in Γ implies the disjunction of the formulas in ∆.
A derivation of a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ (where Γ and ∆ are finite, possibly empty, multisets of formulas, and where if Π is the possibly empty multiset A 1 , . . . , A m then ✷Π is the possibly empty multiset ✷A 1 , . . . , ✷A m ) in G3X is a tree of sequents having Γ =⇒ ∆ as root, initial sequents or instances of rule L⊥ as leaves, and all edges obtained by applications of rules of G3X. As measures for inductive proofs we use the weight of a formula and the height of a derivation. The weight of a formula A, w(A), is defined inductively as follows: w(⊥) = w(p i ) = 0; w(✷A) = w(A) + 1; w(A • B) = w(A) + w(B) + 1 (where • is one of the binary connectives ∧, ∨, ⊃). The height of a derivation is the length of its longest branch. A rule of inference is said to be (height-preserving) admissible in G3X if, whenever its premisses are derivable in G3X, then also its conclusion is derivable (with at most the same derivation height) in G3X. 
Structural rules of inference
We are now going to prove that the calculi G3X have the same good structural properties of G3cp: weakening and contraction are height-preserving admissible in G3X, and cut is admissible in G3X. All proofs are extension of those for G3cp, see [16, Chapter 3] ; in most cases, the modal rules have to be treated differently from the propositional ones because of the presence of empty contexts in the premiss of the modal ones. We adopt the following notational convention: given a derivation tree D k , the derivation tree of the n-th leftmost premiss of its last step is denoted by D kn . We begin by showing that the restriction to atomic initial sequents, which is needed to have the propositional rules invertible, is not limitative in that initial sequents with arbitrary principal formula are derivable in G3X.
Proof. By induction on the weight of A. If w(A) = 0 -i.e., A is atomic or ⊥ -then we have an instance of an initial sequent or of a conclusion of L⊥ and there is nothing to prove. If w(A) ≥ 1, we argue by cases according to the construction of A. In each case we apply, rootfirst, the appropriate rule(s) in order to obtain sequents where some proper subformula of A occurs both in the antecedent and in the succedent. The claim then holds by the inductive hypothesis (IH). To wit, if A ≡ ✷B and we are in G3M(ND), we have:
The left and right rules of weakening:
Proof. The proof is a straightforward induction on the height of the derivation D of Γ =⇒ ∆. If the last step of D is by a propositional rule, we have to apply the same rule to the weakened premiss(es), which are derivable by IH, see [16, Thm. 2.3.4. ]. If it is by a modal one, we proceed by adding A to the appropriate context of the conclusion of that instance of a modal rule. To illustrate, if the last rule is LR-E, we prove that LW is height-preserving admissible by transforming
Before considering contraction, we recall some facts that will be useful later on. Lemma 3.3. In G3X it holds that:
Proof.
1. An induction on the height of the derivation of the premiss (no rule has ⊥ principal in the succedent or ⊤ principal in the antecedent).
2. By a root-first proof search, using the admissibility of the right rule of weakening for R¬.
Lemma 3.4. All propositional rules are height-preserving invertible in G3X, that is the derivability of (a possible instance of ) a conclusion of a propositional rule entails the derivability, with at most same derivation height, of its premiss(es).
Proof. Same as for G3cp, see [16, Thm. 3.1.1].
Theorem 3.5. The left and right rules of contraction:
Proof. The proof is by simultaneous induction on the height of the derivation D of the premiss for left and right contraction. The base case is straightforward. For the inductive steps, we have different strategies according to whether the last step in D is by a propositional or by a modal rule. If the last step in D is by a propositional rule, we have two subcases: if the contraction formula is not principal in that step, we apply the inductive hypothesis and then the rule. Else we start by using the height-preserving invertibility -Lemma 3.4 -of that rule, and then we apply the inductive hypothesis and the rule see [16, Thm. 3.2.2] for details. If the last step in D is by a modal rule, we have two subcases: either (the last step is by one of LR-C, LR-R, LR-K, L-D ✸ 2/n , and L-D * and) both occurrences of the contraction formula A of LC are principal in the last step, else one or no instance of the contraction formula A is principal in the last step and the other(s) is(are) introduced in the appropriate context of its conclusion. In the fist subcase, we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premiss and then the rule. An interesting example is when the last step in D is by L-D ✸2 . We transform
where IH(D 1 ) is obtained by applying the inductive hypothesis for the left rule of contraction to D 1 and IH(D 2 ) is obtained by applying the inductive hypothesis for the right rule of contraction to D 2 .
In the second subcase, we apply an instance of the same modal rule which introduces one less occurrence of A in the appropriate context of the conclusion. Let's consider RC. If the last step is by LR-M and no instance of A is principal in the last rule, we transform
Theorem 3.6. The rule of cut:
Proof. We consider an uppermost application of Cut and we show that either it is eliminable, or it can be permuted upward in the derivation until we reach sequents where that instance of Cut is eliminable. The proofs, one for each calculus, are by induction on the weight of the cut formula D with a sub-induction on the sum of the heights of the derivations of the two premisses (cut-height for short.). As in [16, Thm. 3.2.3] , the proof can be organized in 5 exhaustive cases:
1. The left premiss is an initial sequent or an instance of L⊥;
2. The right premiss is an initial sequent or an instance of L⊥;
3. The cut formula in not principal in the left premiss; 4. The cut formula is principal in the left premiss only; 5. The cut formula is principal in both premisses.
• Cases (1) • Case (3). We have many subcases according to the last rule applied in the derivation of the left premiss (D 1 ). For the propositional rules, we refer the reader to [16, Thm. 3 
where it is given a procedure that allows to reduce the cut-height. If the last rule applied in D 1 is a modal one, we can transform the derivation into a cut-free one because the conclusion of Cut is derivable directly by ending D 1 with the appropriate instance of the same modal rule. We present explicitly only LR-E and LD ⊥ , all other transformations being similar.
LR-E :
If the left premiss is by rule LR-E, we transform
If the left premiss is by rule L-D ⊥ , we transform
If the cut formula D is principal in the left premiss only, the procedure is analogous to that for case (3) . If the right premiss has been derived by a propositional rule, see [16, Thm. 3.2.3] . If it has been derived by a modal rule, we can once again obtain the conclusion of Cut by an appropriate instance of the same rule. The details are left to the reader.
• Case (5) If the cut formula D is principal in both premisses, we have cases according to the principal operator of D, in each cases we have a procedure that allows to reduce to applications of Cut to formulas of lesser weight, possibly increasing the cut-height. For the propositional cases, which are the same for all the logics considered here, see [16, Thm. 3.2.3] .
If D ≡ ✷C, we consider the different logics one by one, without repeating the common cases.
• G3E(ND). Both premisses are by rule LR-E, we have
and we transform it into the following derivation that has two cuts with cut formulas of lesser weight, which are admissible by IH.
. Left premiss by R-N and right one by LR-E. We transform
Left premiss is by LR-E, and right one by L-D ⊥ . We transform
Left premiss is by LR-E, and right one by L-D ✸ . We transform (|Θ| ≤ 1)
Left premiss by LR-E and right one by LD ⋆ . Similar to the cases before.
• G3END ⋆ . Left premiss by R-N and right one by LD ⋆ . Similar to the two cases before.
• G3M(ND). Both premisses are by rule LR-M , we transform • G3MND ⊥ and G3MND ⋆ . The cases with left premiss by RN and right one by any deontic rule have already been considered.
• G3C(ND). Both premisses are by rule LR-C. Let us agree to use Λ to denote the nonempty multiset A 1 , . . . , A n , and Ξ for the, possibly empty, multiset B 2 , . . . B m .
Cut is transformed into a derivation with n + 1 cuts on formulas of lesser weight.
. Left premiss by R-N and right premiss by LR-C. We have
where A 1 , . . . , A n (and thus also ✷A 1 , . . . , ✷A n ) may or may not be the empty multiset. If A 1 , . . . , A n is not empty, we transform it into the following derivation having one cut with cut formula of lesser weigh 
. All subcases are similar to the respective ones for G3R(D).
Decision procedure for G3X
As a corollary of the admissibility of the structural rules, it holds that each calculus G3X has the (strong) subformula property since in all rules in Tables 3 and 4 each active formula is a proper subformula of a principal formula and no formula disappears in moving from premiss(es) to conclusion. As usual, this gives us a syntactic proof of consistency and it gives us an effective method to decide the derivablity of any sequent in G3X: we start from the desired sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ and we construct, root-first, all possible derivation trees until either we find a tree where each leaf is an initial sequent or a conclusion of L⊥ -we have found a G3X-derivation of Γ =⇒ ∆ -or we have checked all possible G3X-derivations and we have found none -Γ =⇒ ∆ is not G3X-derivable. Observe that, given that the modal rules are not invertible, in the root-first decision procedure we may need back-tracking when they are applied (or we can apply all possible instances of a modal rule in parallel). More in details, to decide whether a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3X, we apply the following recursive procedure (we assume that at each node is associated the list of the instances of modal rules that can be applied to it and have not been applied yet) Definition 3.7 (G3X-Decision tree).
1. We write the one node sequent Γ =⇒ ∆; n+1 If the tree constructed at stage n is a G3X-derivation the procedure ends; else we consider each leaf of the tree constructed at stage n and n + 1 1 If some instance of a propositional rule is applicable root-first, we apply it; else n + 1 2 If, for some m > k ≥ 1 , m instances of some modal G3X-rules are applicable and m − k of those instances have been already applied, we apply root-first the m − k + 1instance of a modal rule; else n + 1 3 We goes back in that branch until we reach a node where m instance of some modal rule where applicable and only m − k (for m > k ≥ 1) have been applied in the previous steps, we apply the m − k + 1-instance; else n + 1 4 The procedure ends and we conclude that Γ =⇒ ∆ is not G3X-derivable. Tables 3 and 4 it is easy to acknowledge that the procedure defined above terminates. Let the weight of a sequent be the sum of the weights of the formulas occurring in it. If at step n of a G3X-decision tree for Γ =⇒ ∆ we have Π =⇒ Σ in a leaf, then if at step n + 1 we are either in subcase n + 1 1 or n + 1 2 , then we obtain a finite number of leaves of strictly lesser weight. If we are in subcase n + 1 3 , we backtrack in that branch until we reach a node Π ′ =⇒ Σ ′ where j instances of modal rules still have to be applied. We apply one of these instances, thus obtaining a leaf of weight strictly lesser than Π ′ =⇒ Σ ′ and we know we may backtrack to the node Π ′ =⇒ Σ ′ at most other j − 1 times. Hence, at each (non-final) step we introduces sequents of lesser weight and, possibly, we diminish the number of times that we have to backtrack to a given node. After a finite amount of steps, we will reach a tree that either is a G3X-derivation of Γ =⇒ ∆, or that is such that all its leaves have weight 0 and where we cannot backtrack anymore, hence Γ =⇒ ∆ is not G3X-derivable.
By inspecting the rules in

Equivalence with the axiomatic systems
It is now time to show that the sequent calculi introduced are equivalent to the deontic logics of Sect. 2. We write G3X ⊢ Γ =⇒ ∆ if the sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3X, and we say that a formula A is derivable in G3X whenever G3X ⊢ =⇒ A. We begin by proving the following Lemma 3.8. All the axioms of the axiomatic system X are derivable in G3X.
Proof.
A straightforward root-first application of the rules of the appropriate sequent calculus, possibly using Prop. 3.1. As an example, we show that the deontic axiom D ⊥ is derivable by means of rule L-D ⊥ and that the schema C is derivable by means of LR-C.
Next we prove the equivalence of the sequent calculi for non-normal logics with the corresponding axiomatic systems in the sense that whenever a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3X, its characteristic formula Γ ⊃ ∆ is derivable in X, where the empty antecedent stands for ⊤ and the empty succedent for ⊥. As a consequence each calculus is sound and complete with respect to the appropriate class of neighbourhood models, cf. Sect. 2.2. Theorem 3.9. Derivability in the sequent system G3X and in the axiomatic system X are equivalent, i.e.
To prove the right-to-left implication, we argue by induction of the height of the axiomatic derivation in X. The base case is covered by Lemma 3.8. For the inductive steps, the case of M P follows by the admissibility of Cut and the invertibility of rule R ⊃. If the last step is by RE, then Γ = ∅ and ∆ is ✷C ↔ ✷D. We know that (in X) we have derived ✷C ↔ ✷D from C ↔ D. Remember that C ↔ D is defined as (C ⊃ D) ∧ (D ⊃ C). Thus we assume, by inductive hypothesis (IH), that G3ED ⊢ =⇒ C ⊃ D and G3ED ⊢ =⇒ D ⊃ C, and we proceed as follows
For the converse implication, we assume G3X ⊢ Γ =⇒ ∆, and show, by induction on the height of the derivation in sequent calculus, that X ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆. If the derivation has height 0, we have an initial sequent -so A i(≤n) ≡ B j(≤m) ≡ p k -or an instance on L⊥ -thus A i(≤n) ≡ ⊥.
In both cases the claim holds. If the height is n + 1, we consider the last rule applied in the derivation. If it is a propositional one, the proof is straightforward. If it is a modal rule, we argue by cases.
We begin by considering the deontic rules and R-N . Suppose we are in G3xD ⊥ and we have derived A 1 , . . . , ✷C, . . . , A n =⇒ B 1 , . . . B m from C =⇒. By IH, xD ⊥ ⊢ C ⊃ ⊥, and we know that xD ⊥ ⊢ ⊥ ⊃ C. Thus by RE (or RM , or RR), we get xD ⊥ ⊢ ✷C ⊃ ✷⊥. Now, by contraposing it and then applying a M P with the axiom D ⊥ , we get that xD ⊥ ⊢ ¬✷C. By some easy propositional steps we conclude xD ⊥ ⊢ (A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ✷C ∧ · · · ∧ A n ) ⊃ (B 1 ∨ · · · ∨ B m ). The cases of L-D ⋆ , and R-N can be treated in a similar manner.
We now consider rules L-D ✸2 and L-D ✸n . Suppose we are in G3CD ✸ and we have derived ✷A, ✷B, ✷C, Γ =⇒ ∆ from the premisses A, B, C =⇒ and =⇒ A, B and =⇒ A, C (and =⇒ B, C). By induction we get that CD ✸ ⊢ A ∧ B ∧ C ⊃ ⊥ and CD ✸ ⊢ A ∨ B, and CD ✸ ⊢ A ∨ C. By propositional steps we have that also B ∧ C ⊃ ¬A and ¬A ⊃ B ∧ C are theorems of CD ✸ . By applying RE we get that
which, thanks to axioms C and D ✸ , entails that
By some propositional steps we conclude
The case of L-D ✸2 is similar and can be left to the reader. Notice that for both rules we know that we have at least two principal formulas since otherwise the calculus would prove the empty sequent.
If the last step of a derivation in G3E(ND) is by rule LR-E, then A i(≤n) ≡ ✷C and B j(≤m) ≡ ✷D, and we have derived A 1 , . . . , ✷C, . . . , A n =⇒ B 1 , . . . ✷D, . . . B m from C =⇒ D and D =⇒ C. By IH, ED ⊢ C ↔ D, thus ED ⊢ ✷C ↔ ✷D. By some propositional steps we conclude ED ⊢ (A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ✷C ∧ · · · ∧ A n ) ⊃ (B 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ✷D ∨ · · · ∨ B m ). The cases of LR-M , LR-R, and LR-K can be treated in a similar manner (thanks, respectively, to the rule RM , RR, RK from Table 1 ).
If we are in G3C(ND), suppose the last step is the following instance of LR-C:
By IH, we have that C(ND) ⊢ D ⊃ C i for all i ≤ k, and, by propositional reasoning, we have that C(ND) ⊢ D ⊃ C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k . We also know, by IH, that C(ND) ⊢ C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k ⊃ D. By applying RE to these two theorems we get that
By using axiom C and some propositional steps, we know that
By applying transitivity to (4) and (3) and some propositional steps, we conclude that
By combining this with the results in Theorem 2.6 we have the following result.
Corollary 3.10. The calculus G3X is sound and complete with respect to the class of all neighbourhood models for X.
Craig's Interpolation Theorem
In this section we give, for each modal or deontic logic X which has neither C nor D ✸ as axiom, a constructive proof of Craig's interpolation theorem by means of the well-known Maehara's technique, see [12, 13] . In order to prove this theorem, we use the following notions Definition 4.2. A partition of a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ is any pair of sequents
Notice that one or more of the multisets Γ 1 , Γ 2 , ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 may be empty, and that when the set of propositional variables in (Γ 1 ∪ ∆ 1 ) ∩ (Γ 2 ∪ ∆ 2 ) is empty, the X-interpolant has to be constructed from ⊥ (and ⊤). The proof of Theorem 4.1 is by the following lemma, originally due to Maehara [12] .
Lemma 4.3. If G3X ⊢ Γ =⇒ ∆ and neither LR-C nor L-D ✸2/n are primitive rules of G3X, then every partition of Γ =⇒ ∆, Γ 1 =⇒ ∆ 1 || Γ 2 =⇒ ∆ 2 , has a G3X-interpolant.
Proof. The proofs is by induction on the height of the derivation D of Γ =⇒ ∆. Basically we have to show that each partition of an initial sequent (or of a conclusion of a 0-premiss rule) has a G3X-interpolant and that for any rule of G3X, we have an effective procedure that allows us to obtain a G3X-interpolant for any partition of its conclusion from the interpolant(s) of suitable partition(s) of its premiss(es). Notice that the proof is modular and, hence, we can consider the modal rules directly without having to consider the different modal calculi. For the base case of initial sequents with p principal formula, we have four possible partitions, whose interpolants are:
, p and for the base case of rule L⊥, we have:
For the proof of (some of) the propositional cases the reader is referred to [21, pp. 117-118 ], thus we have only to prove that all the modal rules of Table 4 (with the exception of LR-C and L-D ✸ ) behave as desired.
• LR-E) If the last rule applied in D is
we have four kinds of partitions of the conclusion:
In each of the four possible cases we have to choose a suitable partition of the premisses that allows us to construct a G3E(ND)-interpolant for the partition of the conclusion under consideration.
In case (1) we have
LR-E
To wit, by IH there is some C (D) that is a G3E(ND)-interpolant of the partition of the left (right) premiss. Thus (i) ⊢ A =⇒ B, C (ii) ⊢ C =⇒ (iii) ⊢ B =⇒ A, D and (iv) ⊢ D =⇒ . Since the common language of the partitions of the premisses is empty -i.e. (Γ 1 ∪ ∆ 1 ) ∩ (Γ 2 ∪ ∆ 2 ) = ∅, no propositional variable can occur in C nor in D, therefore C ≡ ⊥ and D ≡ ⊥. Here is a proof that ⊥ is a G3E(ND)-interpolant of the partition under consideration:
The proof goes as follows. By IH it holds that some C and D are G3E(ND)-interpolants of the given partitions of the premisses.
Here is a proof that ✷C is a G3E(ND)-interpolant of the partition under consideration (observe that ✷D works equally well):
By IH, there are C and D that are G3E(ND)-interpolants of the partitions of the premisses. Thus (i) ⊢=⇒ B, C (ii) ⊢ C, A =⇒ (iii) ⊢=⇒ A, D and (iv) ⊢ D, B =⇒ . We prove that ✸D is a G3E(ND)-interpolant of the (given partition of the) conclusion as follows
By IH, there are G3E(ND)-interpolants C and D of the partitions of the premisses. Thus (i)
Since the common language of the partitions of the premisses is empty, no propositional variable can occur in C nor in D, therefore C ≡ ⊤ and D ≡ ⊤. We can show that ⊤ is a G3E(ND)-interpolant of the partition under consideration as follows:
we give directly the G3M(ND)-interpolants of the possible partitions of the conclusion (and of the appropriate partition of the premiss). The proofs are parallel to those for LR-E.
In case (1) we have two subcases according to whether Π 2 is empty or not. If it is not empty we have
LR-R
This can be shown as follows. By IH, there is a G3R(D ⋆ )-interpolant C of the chosen partition of the premiss. Thus (i) ⊢ A, Π 1 =⇒ B, C and (ii) ⊢ C, Π 2 =⇒, and we have the following proofs
L¬
When Π 2 (and ✷Π 2 ) is empty we cannot proceed as above, since in the right derivation we cannot apply LR-R. But in this case we know that the G3R(D ⋆ )-interpolant of the premiss is ⊥ since the common language is empty. Hence we have
LR-R
Cases (2) and (3) are similar to the corresponding cases for rule LR-E:
In case (4) we have two subcases according to whether Π 1 is empty or not. If it is not empty we have
The proofs are similar to those of case (1) .
we give directly the G3K(D ⋆ )-interpolants of the possible partitions of the conclusion (and of the appropriate partition of the premiss).
The proofs are, respectively, parallel to those for cases (2) and (3) of LR-E.
we have two kinds of partitions of the conclusion:
By IH, there is a G3x(N)D ⊥ -interpolant C of the partition of the premiss. Thus ⊢ A =⇒ C and ⊢ C =⇒. The common language is empty, therefore C ≡ ⊥. Here is a proof that ⊥ is also a G3x(N)D ⊥ -interpolant of the conclusion
By IH we have that, for some C, ⊢=⇒ C and ⊢ C, A =⇒. Since the common language is empty, it follows that C ≡ ⊤. Here we prove that ⊤ is a G3x(N)D ⊥ -interpolant of the conclusion
we have the following kind of partition
In the logics G3K(D ⊥ ) we have
By IH, there is some C that is an interpolant of the premiss. It holds that ⊢ Π 1 =⇒ C and ⊢ C, Π 2 =⇒ . We show that ✷C is a G3K(D * )-interpolant of the partition of the conclusion as follows (observe that, with minor changes, we can show that also ✸C is a G3K(D * )-interpolant of that partition):
For G3R(D * ) we can proceed as for G3K(D * ) whenever Π 1 is not empty, whereas if it is empty, we have:
To wit, by IH we know there is a G3R(D * )-interpolant C of the partition of the premiss. Thus ⊢ =⇒ C and ⊢ C, Π 2 =⇒ . Since the common language is empty, C ≡ ⊤, and we have the following derivations:
Notice that in the right derivation we know that Π 2 is not empty and, therefore, that LR-R is applicable, since otherwise Π would be empty and we would have a subproof of D ending with the empty sequent.
The interpolants are (the proofs are similar to those for L-D ⊥ ):
This completes the proof. Observe that the proof is constructive in that Lemma 4.3 gives a procedure to construct an interpolant for A ⊃ B from a given proof of A =⇒ B. Furthermore the proof is purely proof-theoretic in that it makes no use of model-theoretic notions.
Craig's theorem is often -e.g. in [13] for an extension of classical logic -stated in the following stronger version:
If A ⊃ B is a theorem of the logic X, then 1. If A and B share some propositional variable, there is a formula C, which contains propositional variables common to A and B only, such that both A ⊃ C and C ⊃ B are theorems of X; 2. if A and B share no propositional variable, then either ¬A or B is a theorem of X.
But the second condition doesn't hold for many modal and deontic logics. To wit, let p and q be two different propositional variables, it holds that E ⊢ ✷(p ⊃ p) ⊃ ✷(q ⊃ q), but neither ¬✷(p ⊃ p) nor ✷(q ⊃ q) is a theorem of E (the same holds in M, R, and in their deontic extensions). In Fig. 3 we give the construction of an E-interpolant of ✷(p ⊃ p) ⊃ ✷(q ⊃ q). Among the deontic logics considered here, the stronger version of Craig's theorem holds only for END ⊥(✸) , MND ⊥(✸) , and KD ⊥(✸) , as shown by the following Proof. Suppose that XD ⊢ A ⊃ B and that A and B share no propositional variable, then the interpolant C is constructed from ⊥ and ⊤ by means of classical and deontic operators. Whenever D ⊥ := ✸⊤ and N := ✷⊤ are theorems of XD, we have that ✸⊤ ↔ ⊤, ✷⊤ ↔ ⊤, ✸⊥ ↔ ⊥, and ✷⊥ ↔ ⊥ are theorems of XD. Hence, the interpolant C is (equivalent to) either ⊥ or ⊤. In the first case XD ⊢ ¬A and in the second one XD ⊢ B.
As noted in [3, p. 
Related Works and conclusion
We conclude by sketching here the Gentzen-style calculi for non normal logics presented by Lavendhomme and Lucas [10] and those presented by Indrzejczak [8, 9] .
In [10] set-based sequent calculi for the logics in Figure 1 are introduced and a decision procedure based on these calculi is given. The modal rules considered in [10] are like the rules LR-E, LR-M , LR-C, LR-R, and R-N given in Table 4 save that (i) the ones in [10] don't have contexts in their conclusion and, therefore, weakening has to be taken as a primitive (and noneliminable) rule of inference; and (ii) sequents are defined as pairs of sets of formulas instead of as pairs of multisets of formulas. Having defined sequent as sets, the rule of contraction is implicitly built into the rules in [10] and cannot be expressed as an independent rule. Hence contraction cannot be eliminated from the calculi in [10] . Moreover In [10] the admissibility of cut is proved only with respect to (calculi containing) rules analogous to LR-E and LR-M and the rules for the deontic axioms are not considered. The decision procedure for non-normal logics given in [10] is based on a model-theoretic inversion technique so that it is possible to define a root-first procedure that outputs a derivation for all valid sequents and a finite countermodel for all invalid ones. If we set aside the model-theoretic make-up, the decision procedure in [10] is like the one in Definition 3.7 save that backtracking is replaced by the parallel application of all possible instances of modal rules.
In [8, 9] multiset-based sequent calculi for the non-normal logics E(N) and M(N), as well as for their extension with the axioms D ✸ (as well as T , 4, 5, and B) are given. The rules LR-E, LR-M , and R-N are defined exactly as in Table 4 , but the deontic axiom D ✸ is expressed by the following rule:
A, B =⇒ (=⇒ A, B) ✷A, ✷B, Γ =⇒ ∆
D-2
where the right premiss is present when we are working over LR-E and we don't want to have =⇒ ¬✷⊥ among the derivable sequents, and it has to be omitted when we work over LR-M (or R-N ) and/or when we want to have =⇒ ¬✷⊥ derivable. In the calculi in [8, 9] weakening and contraction are taken as primitive rules and not as admissible one as we did here. Even if it is easy to show that weakening is eliminable from the calculi in [8, 9] , contraction cannot be eliminated because the rule D-2 has exactly two principal formulas and therefore we cannot permute contraction up with respect to instances of this rule as we did for L-D ✸ 2/n in Theorem 3.5. The presence of a non-eliminable rule of contraction makes the elimination of cut more problematic: in most cases we cannot eliminate the cut directly, but we have to consider the rule known as multicut, see [16, p. 88 ]. This shows how an apparently minor change in the formulation of some rule can have major effects on the structural rules of the calculus. From the perspective of structural proof analysis, the calculi considered here are better behaved than the ones considered in [10, 8, 9] because here we have proved that weakening and contraction are height-preserving admissible and we have given a syntactic proof of cut elimination for all logics considered. In particular, contraction, which here is height preserving admissible, cannot be eliminated from the non-normal calculi of [10, 8, 9] . As it is well know, contraction can be as bad as cut for root-first proof search -we may continue to duplicate some formula forever -we believe this is a substantial improvement.
To our knowledge in the literature there is no other systematic proof-theoretic study of interpolation in non-normal logics. In [3, Chap(s). 3.8 and 6.6] a constructive proof of Craig's interpolation theorem (and also of some stronger interpolation theorem such as Lyndon's one) is given for the modal logics K and R, and for some of their extensions, including the deontic ones, but the proof makes use of model-theoretic notions. The only proof of interpolation by the Maeharatechnique in modal logics we know of is given in [22] for KD. For a thorough study of interpolation in modal logics we refer the reader to [4] . A model theoretic proof of interpolation for E is given in [7] , and a coalgebraic proof of (uniform) interpolation for M is given in [20] . We have not been able to prove interpolation for calculi containing LR-C or L-D ✸ 2/n and, as far as we know, it is still an open problem whether the corresponding non-normal logics have the interpolation property or not.
